



California v. American Stores Co.,
U.S. , 90 D.A.R. 4678
No. 89-258 (April 30, 1990).
Section 16 of the Clayton Act Authorizes
Divestiture in Private Actions
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
State of California could sue for divesti-
ture under section 16 of the federal
Clayton Act. In this case, the California
Attorney General sought a preliminary
injunction of the merger of American
Stores and Lucky Stores, claiming that it
violated federal antitrust laws and would
harm consumers in 62 California cities.
Previously, the Ninth Circuit had
ruled that section 16, which authorizes
suits by private parties "threatened by
loss or damage," did not provide for
divestiture as a remedy. This ruling con-
flicted with the First Circuit's holding in
CIA Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO
Carribean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1985).
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that section's 16
language permitting "injunctive
relief ...against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws" is
expansive enough to encompass divesti-
ture. The Court also examined the leg-
islative history and found nothing that
foreclosed a private divestiture remedy.
Instead, the Court found that "[p]rivate
enforcement of the Act was in no sense
an afterthought; it was an integral part of
the congressional plan for protecting
competition." The Court further found
that "[s]ection 16, construed to authorize
a private divestiture remedy when
appropriate in light of equitable princi-
ples, fits well in a statutory scheme that
favors private enforcement, subjects
mergers to searching scrutiny, and
regards divestiture as the remedy best




Six Mexican Workers v.
Arizona Citrus Growers,
904 F.2d 1301,90 D.A.R. 5438,
Nos. 89-15269 and 89-15622 (9th Cir.,
May 21, 1990).
Ninth Circuit Endorses Use of Cy Pres
Distribution of Unclaimed Class
Action Damages
The Ninth Circuit approved the use
of cy pres distribution of unclaimed
damages in a class action brought under
the Farm Labor Contractor Registration
Act. The plaintiff class consisted of
1,349 undocumented Mexican workers
who were employed by defendants dur-
ing the 1976-77 picking season.
Approving certification of the class,
the Ninth Circuit found that the large
number of unlocatable class members
does not prevent certification. According
to the court, "[w]here the goals of the
underlying statute are strictly compen-
satory, a class action resulting in sub-
stantial unclaimed funds will not further
that goal. But where the statutory objec-
tives include enforcement, deterrence or
disgorgement, the class action may be
the 'superior' and only viable method to
achieve those objectives, even despite
the prospect of unclaimed funds."
The court endorsed the use of a cy
pres recovery to distribute unclaimed
funds, and stated that federal courts have
broad discretionary powers in shaping
equitable decrees for distributing
unclaimed class action funds. However,
the court set aside the cy pres remedy
adopted by the trial court, finding that it
did not "adequately target the plaintiff
class" and failed "to provide adequate
supervision over distribution."
White v. City of Norwalk,
F.2d , 90 D.A.R. 4211,
No. 88-6430 (9th Cir., April 18, 1990).
Restricting Speakers at City
Council Meeting Does Not
Violate the First Amendment
The Ninth Circuit held that a
Norwalk city ordinance which provides
for the removal of any speaker who
"make[s] personal, impertinent,
slanderous or profane remarks to any
member of the Council, staff or general
public" during a city council meeting
does not violate the U.S. Constitution.
Although the plaintiffs challenged this
ordinance as imprecise, content-orient-
ed, fatally vague, and overbroad, the
court accepted Norwalk's argument that
the ordinance can be interpreted as stat-
ing that removal may be ordered only
when someone making a proscribed
remark is acting in a way that actually
disturbs or impedes the meeting.
The court stated that while such
meetings have been regarded as limited
public forums, "[p]ublic forum or not,
the usual first amendment antipathy to
content-oriented control of speech can-
not be imported into the Council cham-
bers intact." The court noted that there
are other valid restrictions on a speaker's
right to be heard, such as restricting
speakers to the subject at hand at a meet-
ing and stopping a speaker when his/her
speech becomes irrelevant or repetitious.
Likewise, the court held, prohibiting
speech which disrupts, disturbs, or oth-
erwise impedes the orderly conduct of
the Council meeting is a valid restraint




Delaney v. Superior Court,
Cal.3d-, 90 D.A.R. 4870,
No. S006866 (May 3, 1990).
Unpublished, Non-Confidential
Observations
Protected by Shield Law
The California Supreme Court held
that California's "shield law" protects
unpublished, non-confidential observa-
tions by reporters. In Delaney, Los
Angeles Times reporters Kopetman and
Bertero were called to testify by a crimi-
nal defendant to show that the defendant
did not consent to a search by police. At
the time of the search, the reporters were
accompanying members of the Long
Beach Police Department on patrol. The
Times subsequently published a story
about the incident, but did not refer to
whether the defendant had consented to
the search. In a subsequent municipal
court proceeding, the reporters refused
to answer any questions relating to
whether Delaney had consented. The
municipal court found that the need for
the reporters' testimony outweighed
their claim of immunity under the shield
law, and cited both reporters for con-
tempt. The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County found that the shield
law provided the reporters with immuni-
ty from contempt. On appeal, the court
of appeal held that the shield law does
not give a newsperson the right to refuse
to testify as to his/her observations of a
public event.
The Supreme Court held that Article
I, section 2(b) of the California
Constitution protects reporters from
being adjudged in contempt for refusing
to disclose "any unpublished informa-
tion," including non-confidential, eye-
witness observations of an occurrence in
a public place.
However, the court also held that
courts could still require reporters to dis-
close such information in cases where
nondisclosure would deprive the defen-
dant of his/her federal constitutional
right to a fair trial. In determining
whether disclosure is warranted, the
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court developed a test which accommo-
dates conflicting constitutional rights.
As a threshold matter, the criminal
defendant must show "a reasonable pos-
sibility [that] the information will mate-
rially assist his defense." Next, the court
must consider the importance of protect-
ing the unpublished information in light
of the following factors: (a) whether the
unpublished information is confidential
or sensitive; (b) the interests sought to
be protected by the shield law; (c) the
importance of the information to the
criminal defendant; and (d) whether
there is an alternative source of the
unpublished information. The court also
noted that these factors must be bal-
anced on a case-by-case basis, accord-
ing to their relative importance, and that
an in camera hearing might be required.
Applying the test, the court found
that the trial court struck the correct bal-
ance in requiring the reporters to testify.
The court concluded that because
Delaney's personal freedom was at
stake, and the reporters were not being
asked to breach a confidence or to dis-
close sensitive information that would in
any way restrict their news-gathering





_ Cal.App.3d-, 90 D.A.R. 3641,
No. B036081 (April 2, 1990).
Medi-Cal Audit Method Must Comply
with Administrative Procedure Act
The Second District Court of Appeal
held that an in-house method used by
the California Department of Health
Services (DHS) to audit Medi-Cal
providers should have been promulgated
as a regulation in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
At issue was a random sampling plan
used by DHS which selected a sample
size of 100 pages from a 9,711-page
record of all claims for services ren-
dered to Medi-Cal beneficiaries by the
Petitioner. Based on an audit of the sam-
ple and an extrapolation of the audit
results, DHS estimated an overpayment
to Petitioner of $654,592. Petitioner
challenged the auditing method adopted
by DHS as violative of the APA and
thus void and unenforceable.
In finding for the Petitioner, the court
rejected DHS' argument that the audit
method was exempt from the APA's
rulemaking requirements as an internal
management rule. Reviewing relevant
caselaw, the court concluded that "the
definition of regulation is broad, as con-
trasted with the scope of the internal
management exception, which is nar-
row."
The court noted that the APA, to
which the Department is subject, was
enacted to establish basic minimum pro-
cedural requirements for the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of administrative
regulations promulgated by the state's
many administrative agencies. The APA
requires an agency to give notice of a
specified proposed action, issue a state-
ment of the specific purpose of the
action, and afford interested persons the
opportunity to present comments on the
proposed action. Furthermore, the court
noted that the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) is responsible with the
orderly review of administrative regula-
tions, and may make determinations as
to whether a rule which has not been
adopted pursuant to the APA is in fact a
regulation subject to APA rulemaking
procedures.
During the pendency of the court
proceeding, OAL determined that the
Department's audit procedure is a regu-
lation for purposes of the APA. Since
the audit technique was not duly adopt-
ed as a regulation pursuant to the APA,
OAL deemed it an invalid and unen-
forceable "underground" regulation. The
court noted that "OAL's determination
in this regard is entitled to due defer-
ence."
Watson et al. v. California Fair
Political Practices Commission,
Watson et al. v. The Rules
Committee of the Senate of the State
of California,
Cal. App. 3d , 90 D.A.R. 1312,
No. B042250/B041680 and No.
B041680/B042250
(February 2, 1990).
Proposition 73s Restriction on
Newsletters Upheld
The Second District Court of Appeal
upheld Proposition 73's ban on the use
of public funds for newsletters or other
mass mailings by a legislator after
he/she has filed nomination documents
for local, state, or federal office. (See
CRLR Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) pp. 140-
41 and Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1988) p. 1
for extensive background informa-
tion on Propositions 68 and 73.)
In two cases brought by legislators,
the court rejected the argument that he
ban interferes with the legislature's
authority to govern its internal affairs
and make its own rules. On this point,
the court stated: "[w]hile there can be
no question that both the Senate and the
Assembly possess the power to create
and administer their own internal affairs,
it does not strike us that the newsletter
program in either house falls within the
exclusive sway of the rule making pro-
cess. These programs extend far beyond
the halls of the Legislature and impact
virtually every citizen of this state."
The court also found that the rule
making authority is limited to the inter-
nal workings of the Senate and
Assembly and does not encompass mat-
ters which are addressed to the world
outside the legislature. The court reject-
ed plaintiffs' argument that this provi-
sion constitutes an impermissible
attempt at rule making by the electorate.
The court found it to be, instead, a valid
effort by which the electorate seeks to
control the allotment of limited state
revenues and reform the electoral pro-
cess.
The court also rejected the argument
that the ban violates a legislator's right
to communicate with the electorate,
freedom of association, the right to vote,
to petition government for the redress of
grievances, and to instruct and recall
elected representatives. According to the
court, the federal Constitution simply
bars governmental interference with
those rights; it contains no guarantee
that the government will monetarily
subsidize the exercise of that right.
Finally, the court rejected arguments
that the prohibition on the use of public
funds for legislative newsletters is unre-
lated to any legitimate state purpose and
that the ban violates the single subject
rule. It found that the ban is directed at
removing some of the substantial advan-
tages enjoyed by incumbent officehold-
ers over their challengers, and is reason-
ably related to Proposition 73's overall
goal of reforming the political process.
California Common Cause v.
Fair Political
Practices Commission,
Cal. App. 3d _____, 90 D.A.R. 6021,
No. C005458 (May 30, 1990).
Proposition 73's Ban on Public
Financing of Campaigns Upheld
The Third District Court of Appeal
upheld Proposition 73's prohibition on
the use of public monies for political
campaigns. The court unanimously
rejected Common Cause's argument that
Government Code section 81000 et seq.
impermissibly binds future legislatures
from enacting any legislation regarding
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the public funding of political cam-
paigns. The court concluded that section
85300 does not conflict with any consti-
tutional provision and that it "merely
forbids the expenditure or use of public
monies for the purpose of seeking elec-
tive office."
The court found Common Cause's
argument necessarily implied that sec-
tion 85300 is an absolute, inflexible pro-
vision beyond the power of the legisla-
ture to change. However, as the court
noted, section 85300 may be amended
by a two-thirds vote of the legislature
and approval by the Governor.
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court,
Cal. App. 3d-, 90 D.A.R. 946,
No. C005750 (January 23, 1990).
Governor's Appointment Schedules
Subject to Public Disclosure
The Third Appellate District held
that the Governor's appointment sched-
ules and calendars are public records
which must be disclosed to persons
seeking access to those materials under
the California Public Records Act
(Government Code section 6250 et
seq.). The court rejected the Governor's
claim that the materials are exempt from
disclosure under Government Code sec-
tion 6254 ("correspondence of and to
the Governor of employees of the
Governor's office"). The court conclud-
ed that "correspondence" does not
include "all written communications,"
but is limited solely to "communication
by letter."
The court also rejected the
Governor's claim that disclosure of the
schedules is contrary to the public inter-
est. It found that disclosure would not
intrude on either the Governor's privacy
or the deliberative process, and that any
legitimate security concerns could be
adequately addressed by disclosure of
non-exempt material following an in
camera review.
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